Somalia’s Post-Conflict Economy:
A Political Economy Approach1
Abdi Ismail Samatar

To do the impossible you must see the invisible.
Egyptian Development Expert
I. Introduction
Much discussion has taken place about reviving the Somali economy
since the dawn of the new century.2 These conversations have not critically assessed what bedeviled the Somali economy during the tenure
of the old regime and since its collapse. Further, no one has yet articulated an appropriate framework that accounts for the country’s past
and the ways in which a new Somali order can profitably learn from
and engage with recent developments in the global environment. The
factors that crippled the old order and that sustain the civil war must
be identified and contained, if not fully controlled, during and after
the transition. Among the ills that plague the Somali economy are
structural constraints, mismanagement of public resources, a political
elite whose preoccupation is looting the commons, lawlessness and
warlord rule, and a disorganized public that failed to unite against a
sectarian political agenda that stoked conflict between communities.
The prospect that the transition will be economically successful is grim
unless a conscious and concerted effort is made to reduce these political liabilities.
The extreme lawlessness of the last one-and-a-half decades made
the population’s working and living conditions exceptionally precari-
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ous, particularly in the south. Roaming militias destroyed farming
communities and the rudimentary agricultural infrastructure. In many
instances, a significant proportion of the farming population in the
irrigated regions was dislocated and became internally displaced persons (IDPs). Displacement was not limited to the riverine agrarian
sector, as successive embargos by importing countries of the Middle
East brought livestock exports, the mainstay of the economy, to a halt,
except in the southern end of the country.3 In addition, many people
lost their assets during the civil war. In Hargeisa and Garowe, where
order was restored, regional authorities reinvented the old corrupt
system in which the ruling strata and its clients use public power and
resources as personal gifts. The only difference between their management style and that of the old regime is that they do not have enough
strength to control the market. The level of corruption in these areas
and in the Transitional Federal Government (TFG) has equaled if not
exceeded that of the Barre years. Elsewhere, warlords who control
other areas, mostly in south-central Somalia, devastated the region as
they turned any public resource capable of generating revenue into
their booty, without restoring order.
The last two decades have also produced two new generations of
Somalis who are not equipped to creatively engage with the 21st century. Young people are the country’s most precious resource and their
loss is tantamount to a miserable future. Another product of statelessness is the destruction of public trust. Barre’s regime tribalized
government institutions, which undermined people’s confidence in
public affairs. Warlords, factional, and regional leaders have turned
genealogy into the dominant political identity. Such a degeneration
has eroded communal cohesion and continues to block the pathways
to deep reconciliation and social rehabilitation. Clanization of political identity and the loss of two generations are profound liabilities
that will frustrate economic reconstruction for years to come. Rescuing
these two generations and rebuilding the social fabric by rehabilitating
national identity are necessary prerequisites for sustainable economic
recovery.4
The only silver lining to this gruesome tale is the remarkable initiative most citizens undertook to fend for themselves. Some had created
profitable enterprises while others had engaged in shadowy businesses
(such as ecologically destructive charcoal export), which have earned
them substantial fortunes. In addition, remittances from Somalis in the
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diaspora, estimated at nearly three-quarters of a billion dollars, support a large section of the population.5
This essay examines three issues vital to reconstruction and longterm sustainability. First, it describes the origins and nature of Somalia’s economic crisis and developments focusing on livestock, farming,
and fisheries. Without a grounded analysis of the old era and recent
changes, it is not be possible to chart a viable development pathway.
Part two introduces a conceptual framework that illustrates the nature
of the state-market relations with a particular focus on governed markets. The final section provides a set of recommendations that map the
way forward.
II. Framing the Crisis
Somalia’s underdevelopment has been exacerbated by reckless political leadership that has mismanaged the country since the mid-1970s.
The collapse of the state and political order in 1991 marked a watershed in Somali social and political history. Since that fateful year,
Somalia has become synonymous with hopelessness. The language
of doom is not analytically helpful, however, in understanding the
origins and dynamics of social and political problems. A more apt concept is crisis.6 Crisis refers to a condition in which existing economic
and political circumstances cannot be reproduced along established
norms. Economic crises occur when different productive sectors are
unable to generate even minimal surpluses to repair the diminution of
assets resulting from normal wear and tear. For example, rejuvenating
overgrazed range resources in a pastoral economy requires a fallow
period. If such an imperative is not attended to, livestock will not have
enough feed, and long-term productive capacity of the range might be
damaged. Consequently, livestock health will decline and so will the
profitability of the sector. Such minimum reinvestment is never sufficient if the sector is to contribute not only to its simple reproduction
but to a growing economy. In other words, sustained underinvestment
in productive assets yields diminishing returns that lead to a declining
standard of living. If such a downward spiral is not urgently arrested
and reversed, it will produce economic disaster. Therefore, a crisis is
that transitional moment wherein the old order must be reinvented to
prevent it from involution. Beyond this point, disaster strikes and the
system becomes chaotic, characterized by its vulnerability to natural
perturbations which impair livelihood chances for most people.
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Government plays a strategic role in exacerbating a crisis or reorienting economic signals in order to regenerate economic vitality. But not
all governments have the capacity to take charge. Only those authorities who have legitimacy with the population possess the necessary
credibility to lead the transformation. Legitimacy of state leadership
may be garnered through a track record of delivering development
and/or respecting the rule of law. Unaccountable leaders who have
engaged in rentier economic policies and who have aggravated the
crisis cannot be trusted with reform. Enduring illegitimacy develops
into deep political crisis.7 Such a political crisis reinforces the economic
predicament and leads to catastrophic conditions. Rent seeking and
disregard for the supremacy of the law steadily undermine common
values. The predatory state creates a society that is its mirror image.8
Thus, catastrophe is the product of an ill-managed crisis.
The unnecessary death of hundreds of thousands of Somalis since
the end of Barre’s dictatorship, and the dislocation of over three million
people, are products of the combined effects of political and economic
failure. Events of its last twenty years demonstrate that the tyrannical rent-seeking regime unhinged civic life and deepened poverty.
The warlord- and faction leader-dominated disorder that has prevailed
since the early 1990s in most regions of the country has ossified political fragmentation and looted what was left of the collective goods.
Such a blind economic and political alley has been difficult to break
through. The common and fatalistic Somali utterance, “Wuxuun ba
dicidoona” (Something positive will somehow happen), the byword of
both the elite and the commoners, sounds inane today and has been
replaced by utter despair.
If Somalis are to avoid the further protraction of the prevailing
debilities and greater loss of life and property, they must clearly understand where they have come from and the dynamics that produced
their nightmare. A fundamental part of this history is the disarticulated
structure of the economy.9 The Somali economy had four principal
attributes. First, its organization perpetuated a mismatch between the
basic needs of the people and the incentive structure set by the state
and the market. Second, it relied on conditional foreign loans and
grants as the sole source for investment and development, which reinforced the economic status quo. Third, the state, unsteadily controlled
by factions of the elite, dominated the distribution of foreign aid, leading to misappropriation and misuse of resources and further political
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instability. Fourth, very few public resources were directed to improve
and expand agricultural production.10
Somalia’s collapse in 1991 was preceded by a long period in which
socioeconomic conditions markedly and progressively deteriorated. A
pivotal element in the evolution of the present situation was the conflict between competing factions of the elite over the control and use
of the meager resources of the country.11 This struggle starved the productive sector of the economy, which in turn intensified social cleavages and communal strife.12 The crisis of the Somali economy, then,
resulted from the underaccumulation of capital as well as the political
illegitimacy of the ruling elite.13 It is generally assumed that all sectors
of the economy suffered from the same maladies and, therefore, that
the country was in a crisis. Such a monolithic conception of the problem often leads to a simplistic and generalized prescription for what
was, in actuality, a multitude of liabilities.
This essay provides a political-economic analysis of the conditions
that induced Somalia’s crisis. What follows investigates different manifestations of the issue of capital underaccumulation in three components of the Somali agrarian economy: the pastoral/livestock sector,
the farming sector (i.e., export agriculture and grain/domestic production), and fishing. This focus is warranted because of the absence of a
vibrant industrial or service economy, and the fact that agriculture is
the only productive area that holds the promise of growth and development in the immediate future—that is, in terms of contributing to
accumulation and livelihoods.
Although this paper concentrates on crop and livestock production,
it does recognize the potential significance of other sectors. For example, Somalia has a great potential for fisheries that has been untapped
by the local population.
III. The Crisis of Pastoralism and the Livestock Economy14
Livestock production has been the dominant sector of the Somali economy in terms of employment and foreign exchange earnings for a
long time. The health and vitality of the national economy was always
contingent on the performance of this sector and will continue to be so
in the near future, albeit at a reduced level. Consequently, a coherent
understanding of the problems faced by the pastoral/livestock sector
is essential for any attempt at reconstruction. To fully appreciate the
dire condition of this crucial sector, we need to broaden our conceptual
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horizon in assessing the dynamics and the nature of the pastoral system.
A. Background
Most contemporary social analysts use the word pastoralism to characterize those individuals and communities who make a living by
raising livestock in semiarid regions. The term nomadism is used in
similar fashion.15 This is historically and analytically imprecise, and
most of the literature on the subject is either ill informed, outdated, or
both. Pastoralism is a means of livestock production employed under a
variety of social and historical conditions. The method or the tools of
production do not define the nature of a social system; e.g., capitalism
is not defined by the instruments or the methods used by producers, but rather by the social relations into which various groups enter
in order to produce values and reproduce the existing social order.
Consequently, pastoral livestock production can exist under several
different social and economic systems.16 For example, communitarian
pastoralism in pre-colonial Somali society was a social order in which
the production of use values predominated. In contrast, contemporary
Somali pastoralism is dominated by a commercial system and the production of exchange values. The commercial system that prevails in
the country can be thought of as peripheral capitalism. Thus, pastoral
production has become central to the reproduction of a larger social constellation dominated by the state and merchants.
Pre-colonial Somali society was stateless in character and all adult
members were engaged in production. This system was fundamentally communitarian in that it lacked an institutionalized social and
economic hierarchy. This interpretation of Somali social history does
not deny the existence of some communities (e.g., the riverine areas of
the south) whose local social relations were at variance with the dominant system. Nevertheless, the principal mode of production, communitarian pastoralism, lacked the systematized forms of oppression
associated with class societies. However, as Somali society became an
integral part of the global capitalist system, beginning in the late 19th
century, the forces of the world-system had a transformative effect
upon it.
The transition from one social system to another entails the remaking of previous social and property relations. The emerging order
bears the imprint of the new age, although it retains aspects of the old
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regime, such as the method and objects of production. Contemporary
Somali social structure displays the emblem of capitalist transition,
clearly heralding the passing of a way of life. Communitarian pastoralism, through production and consumption of use values, sustained
the producers without its major products circulating as a commodity,
whereas contemporary pastoral production supports two additional
and dominant social groups: the merchants and the state.
Pre-colonial Somalia was not isolated from the mercantile world.
However, the external world and the logic of mercantilism had only a
marginal influence over the reproduction of everyday life. It was only
after livestock became the chief object of trade that the present social
relations emerged. The constitution of pastoralist-merchant-state relations over the last century entailed the emergence of social classes and
the gradual eclipse of communitarian pastoralism. This broad scheme
provides an appropriate conceptual framework to delineate the genesis and nature of the crisis in the sector.
The slow but steady decomposition of communitarian Somali traditions began in the 19th century with the imposition of colonial rule and
the gradual “commodification” of livestock (i.e., the shift toward viewing livestock as a commodity). Livestock trade since the last decade of
that century laid the foundation for the colonial and postcolonial economy. Among the earliest and most visible changes was the emergence
of pastoralist-merchant-state relationships based on the livestock trade.
The general history and organization of this trade have been dealt with
elsewhere.17 Merchants have not been the only group that siphoned
resources from pastoralists. The colonial state did so as well. Somali
pastoralists have produced “surpluses” that have been captured by the
state since the society first became a colony in the 1880s. In more recent
years, livestock exports have been the single most important hard-currency earner, accounting for nearly 80–90 percent of the total annual
foreign exchange earnings (until this trade was disrupted by the civil
war in the north in 1988).
The development of merchant-pastoralist-state relationships in
Somali society over the last century marks a definite break with precolonial tradition. The relationships sketched above constitute the
domestic matrix that shapes the configuration of changes taking place
in pastoral areas. Such structural relationships between merchants and
the state, on the one hand, and producers, on the other, bound the
limits of this economy. Consequently, a key element in the contemporary trauma of Somali pastoralism is its declining capacity to sustain
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the intensifying reproduction requirements of the producers, the merchants, and the state class.
In the highly commercialized context of Somali livestock production, little is known about the degree of internal differentiation among
pastoralists.18 However, property relations in the rangeland have not
been formally restructured, and the process of privatizing community
resources is not advanced, although the enclosure of the pastoral commons has increased significantly since 1991.19 In the absence of direct
appropriation of Somali rangeland by non-pastoral producers, many
students of Somali society continue to assume the vitality of a precapitalist social system. In view of this, the pastoral-merchant-state
relationship first established during the colonial era seems stable and
often problem-free to most Somalists. Their argument has been that
pastoralists, by selling their livestock, earn a return sufficient to enable
them to purchase basic foods and other goods, while merchants make
profits sufficient to sustain themselves, and the state collects taxes and
gains precious foreign exchange.20
Pastoralists’ production of an indigenous food commodity and its
subsequent export appeared to satisfy three often contradictory objectives of development in Africa: the need to earn foreign exchange, the
necessity to maintain or increase domestic food production, and the
desire for a wider distribution of income. This view of Somali society,
premised on communitarian pastoralism and subsequently perpetuated by Somalist scholarship, conceals the qualitative transformation
of social relations described earlier. More significantly, such a conception fails to grasp the problem of reproduction in the existing social
formation, to which this essay now turns.
B. Transformation and Conjuncture
Scholarly literature on Somali development seldom addresses directly
the reproduction of the pastoral-merchant-state relationship. The only exceptions are certain works by Jeremy Swift and Dan Aronson.21 Swift was
the first researcher to point to the deterioration of pastoral barter terms
of trade after the turn of the century. He noted that the commercialization of pastoral life brought about the decomposition of traditional
Somali social relations. The disintegration of the pre-capitalist Somali
pastoral system under the tutelage of commercial capital led to ecological degradation and increased pastoral vulnerability to the fluctuations of the semiarid climatic regime. Aronson extends this analysis by
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indicating that Somali pastoralists are caught in an exploitative trap
engineered by the state elite and the merchants.
Swift and Aronson’s studies are significant contributions because
they call for a new direction for Somali (pastoral) development research.
These studies, however, suffer from one major weakness. Written at a
time when livestock prices were very high and the merchants and state
elite were enjoying tremendous windfalls, they overlook the structural
weakness of the system. In other words, although both are sympathetic
to the position of the pastoralists and their future, neither author recognized the structural weaknesses of the relationship or the struggle
over its reproduction.
In the 1950s and 1960s, Somali livestock export earnings were
enhanced by the simultaneous development of oil resources in Saudi
Arabia and the significant increase in the number of livestock-sacrificing pilgrims to the Islamic holy land.22 The oil price shocks of
the early 1970s and the resultant phenomenal growth of petrodollars
in Saudi Arabia led to a construction boom. Consequently, shortages
of both skilled and unskilled labor in Saudi Arabia necessitated the
importation of thousands of workers from the Middle East, Northeast
Africa, and South Asia, which in turn led to increased demand for food
imports, particularly meat. The growth in the demand for meat and the
global inflationary pressures of the period drove up livestock prices
enormously. Somalia, which initially accounted for nearly 90 percent
of Saudi livestock imports (particularly during the Hajj season), reaped
fantastic windfalls for the whole decade.23 For example, the prices of
sheep/goats, cattle, and camels increased between 1960 and 1978 from
about $8, $30, and $40 to $44, $195, and $278 per head, respectively.
Such increases in livestock prices far outstripped the domestic inflation
rates of the period.
The 1980s were not as kind to the Somali livestock export trade
as the 1970s. Subsequently, Saudi Arabia’s buoyant market attracted
suppliers from as far away as Australia. Such internationalization
of the supply chain in the 1980s triggered a tremendous increase in
the supply of livestock, with the consequent downward pressure on
prices. The sudden decline in oil prices in the mid-1980s, the resultant
financial difficulties in Saudi Arabia, and the globalization of the livestock trade in the Middle East intensified competition in the industry.
Somalia’s authoritarian regime was ambivalent about losing its share
of the reduced market in the oil kingdom. Consequently, it enacted a
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Table 1. Official Livestock Prices (in $/head)a

Sheep
Cattle
Camelb

Before
January 1984
53
280
450

After January 1985
42
213
390

Percent change in price
-20.76
-23.93
-13.13

Source: A. Samatar, “Social Classes,” p. 112.
Notes: a. Export prices fluctuated but were consistently higher in years prior to 1985.
b. Although there has not been an increase in the downward pressure on camel
export prices, camel prices declined because of the generalized price reduction
policy of the regime. Such losses were unnecessary.

substantial reduction of Somali livestock prices in January 1985 (see
Table 1).
The decline in livestock prices, coupled with the long-term stagnation in the quantity of animals exported (livestock exports peaked
in 1972), presented a grave threat to the established social relations
between pastoralists, merchants, and the state. This threat came in the
form of declining terms of trade for producers, declining profits for the
merchants, and reduced foreign exchange earnings for the state. For
the pastoralists, the threat induced by the price squeeze might have
meant a reduction in their basic level of subsistence. In the past, they
were able to mitigate such pressures by increasing their livestock holdings and exploiting more marginal areas. However, this time-tested
strategy was no longer effective because virtually all the marginal land
exploitable under current methods of production had been put to use.
A common but unexamined belief among many Somalists is that
pastoralists, whose superior skills have been honed by centuries of
experience, are the most appropriate custodians of the pastoral range.24
This contention notwithstanding, the lore and appropriate skills of the
pastoralist, which made the semiarid region productive and profitable, have been progressively undermined by the scarcity of accessible
rangeland and an ecological deterioration generated by the commodification of pastoralism under a peripheral capitalist regime.25 Pastoralists are increasingly hemmed in by the growing population, limited
rangelands, and the overuse of the commons. This situation is rendering pre-capitalist pastoral knowledge and management systems
defunct or incapable of sustaining this form of commercial pastoral
production. In this sense, the prevailing situation of Somali livestock
production echoes the condition of the rural economy in Botswana in
the early 1970s:
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By the early 1970s the situation in the rural areas was nearly chaotic,
yielding the possibility of a long-term damage to the environment and
apparently providing absolute limits to the further development of
[commercial] cattle production. The conditions for the expansion of that
production in the 1960s became its fetters in the 1970s.26

The stagnation of livestock exports, the diminishing capacity of the
rangelands, downward pressures on livestock prices, and skyrocketing domestic inflation finally exposed the exploitative and unproductive relations between the claimant classes and the rural producers.
Such pressure on prices and the profit squeeze on the system could
perhaps be treated in the short run by simply redistributing the losses.
However, in the long run, reproduction of these relations will require a
significant restructuring of the system.
Livestock merchants were differentially affected by the price
squeeze. Although merchants constitute a class as defined by their
relations to the producers, they are by no means a monolithic group.
For example, the 923 livestock exporters based in the hinterland of
the main city of Berbera from 1981–1986 can be differentiated into
three strata on the basis of the number of animals they exported and
the profits they obtained. The distribution of livestock exports among
the merchants indicates a process of social differentiation wherein
this class is segmented into poor, middle, and rich merchants. The
three groups are those who exported from 1–9,999, 10,000–49,000, and
50,000–149,000 animals, respectively. Category One merchants consisted mainly of those whose operations were barely sufficient to satisfy their requirements for basic subsistence. Their median sale was
about 580 animals annually, with a corresponding profit of $1,740 (the
minimum net profit per sheep or goat was $3). Middle-size merchants’
median export was 4,500 animals annually, with a profit of $12,600. By
contrast, the median sale of the rich strata was 12,500 animals annually,
with a profit of $37,500. About 85 percent of the merchant population
fell into the indigent camp, and 12 percent and 3 percent belong to the
middle and rich strata, respectively. This means that the top 15 percent
of the merchant class accounted for about 70 percent of the sales and,
hence, for the industry’s profits.
Based on the above distribution of sales and profits, it seems that
the three strata of merchants have contrasting reproduction requirements in spite of their common class base. In other words, the priority
of the poor group, under prevailing conditions, was simply to survive
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as merchants; they had little prospect of enhancing their location in
the hierarchy. It is important to note here the common assumption
in Somalia that most livestock merchants are in the profitable import
trade and consequently have large real estate investments. Such a perception is contradicted by the results of field research. Of the seventy
indigent merchants interviewed, only two had real estate properties,
and none were involved in the import trade. In contrast, the decline
in export prices has reduced the profit margins of the middle and rich
merchants, but did not endanger their immediate status as one of the
wealthiest groups in the country. Most of the members of these two
groups were heavily involved in the import trade and had relatively
extensive real estate properties in major towns and cities. However,
over the long haul, a continuing decline in export prices and the longterm stagnation of the number of animals exported boded ill, even
prior to the dissolution of social order, for the future of middle and rich
merchants. This was because their capacity to import commodities (in
the lucrative import trade) has always been contingent on the availability of foreign exchange.27
Finally, the Somali state, strapped for foreign exchange, was further
impoverished by the combined effect of the drop in export prices and
the stagnation of livestock exports. In the absence of other domestic
sources of foreign exchange, its reliance on external assistance intensified, deepening the disconnection and alienation between the state and
society.
The fortunes of the sector have not changed substantially since
1991. Livestock trade nearly came to a standstill in the early 1990s, but
slowly recovered and peaked at about 2.9 million in 1997. Saudi Arabia’s two import bans of Somali livestock, due to the claimed presence
of rift valley fever, significantly slowed down exports. Consequently,
Somali merchants have begun to diversify their export markets into
the United Arab Emirates. Others in the southernmost regions have
redirected trade towards Kenya, while a handful of entrepreneurs have
established small abattoirs and ship chilled meat to other destinations
in the Middle East.
It was recently suggested that the producers capture 85–92% of the
free-on-board (FOB) price,28 but the evidence to sustain this assertion is
slim. First, the analysis on which this statement is based did not consider the fact that several intermediaries exist between the producer
and the export merchant. The exactions by these actors reduce returns
to the producer. Second, evidence from the late 1990s suggests that the
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barter terms of trade for producers has not improved, particularly after
the Saudi ban on exports. Such lacuna is due to the limited scope of the
analysis. Structural relations—social and ecological—that limited the
sector’s robustness remain in place despite the recovery of the export
trade. Unless these barriers are carefully examined, the sector and the
larger economy will not recover and prosper.
C. The Crisis in the Farm Sector
Crop production is the other main productive area of the country’s
economy. This sector consists of the peasant-dominated grain producing area, and the export-oriented fruit (mainly banana) plantation
enterprises. As in the pastoral sector, which produces food for both
export and domestic consumption, grain and banana production contribute to the internal and external accounts as well. However, national
grain production has usually fallen far short of satisfying domestic
needs, although the potential for growth is particularly great in irrigated areas.
Despite the promise, the sector suffered from maladies somewhat
similar to those that bedeviled the livestock economy. The crop sector’s
afflictions were the result of woefully rudimentary tools of production,
environmental problems, absence of agrarian services, mismanaged
markets, arbitrary price controls, and an impoverished labor force.
These political-economic and ecological factors articulated differently in the grain-producing areas than in the banana economy. The
combination of these factors limited the sector’s capacity to produce
sufficient output to provide for farmers as well as to satisfy other
domestic needs. Thus, the crisis of the crop sector was defined by the
mismatch between its potential capacity to produce larger quantities of
food and exports, the growing needs of an increasing population, and
the absence of legitimate government institutions that could facilitate
appropriate and necessary reforms. This structure reinforced the rural
population’s vulnerability to climatic cycles and deepened poverty.
Somalia’s agrarian crises are embedded in the institutional order left
behind by the former colonial governments and the regimes that have
reigned ever since. The warlords and regional faction leaders have
turned the crisis into a calamity. Future attempts to reform the system
must therefore deal gingerly with the factors that impede progress in
order to enable peasants and others who work in the sector to become
more productive and earn sufficient returns for their toil.
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1. The Grain Sector
Somalia was a grain-deficient country long before the military regime’s
tenure and the disaster since the 1990s. Unlike the civilian governments
that preceded it, the junta proclaimed its commitment to a policy of
food self-sufficiency.29 Although this new strategy increasingly relied
on state farms and agricultural crash programs to provide for the bulk
of the country’s food needs, such projects never yielded more than a
fraction of their planned targets. Consequently, the country never produced enough food for itself, and, state neglect notwithstanding, the
peasantry remained the principal producer of food grains. State-peasant relations during the 1970s were characterized by (1) an extraction
of resources through both price controls and forced produce deliveries
(through marketing boards) and (2) absolute neglect in the provision of
credit and other necessary agricultural inputs.30 The net results of this
strategy were a decline in crop production and stagnation (see Table
2).
Although the sharp declines in grain production from 1970–1980
were in some years certainly due to unfavorable climatic conditions
(e.g., the 1973–1974 drought), the principal cause for the decade-long
failure to make progress toward national food self-sufficiency was
inappropriate agricultural policy. The state-inspired approach during
this period reflected the opportunistic and quasi-nationalist predispositions of the governing elite. Without much understanding of the
needs of peasant producers or the technical requirements of food production in the peasant environment, the regime imposed a rigid policy
that undermined its own objective of food self-reliance. Government
leaders had two reasons for adopting such a strategy. First, under the
tutelage of the Soviets, they believed that controlling the marketing
of agricultural produce was “proof” of their socialist orientation. Second, the strategy brought an important sector of the economy under
the ambit of the regime and therefore provided an avenue to employ
more bureaucrats to make good on the inflated promises made on the
morrow of the coup. Consequently, the expansion of an unproductive
bureaucratic class at the cost of robust and thriving rural production
foreclosed a vibrant agrarian sector.
The introduction of neo-liberal economic reform, a result of the 1981
structural adjustment agreement between the International Monetary
Fund (IMF) and the Somali government, eliminated both price controls
and mandatory grain deliveries to the state. These reforms, coinciding
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Table 2. Production of Food and Nonfood Crops, 1970-1986
(in thousands of metric tons)

1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986

Grains, beans,
and oil seeds

Sugar,
vegetables,
and fruits

Total
food output

Nonfood
crops

Total
output

Output
index
(relative to
1970)

342.2
278.6
323.4
229.3
274.2
294.3
350.7
319.0
313.1
312.3
315.9
449.3
478.1
444.8
563.7
634.0
713.0

376.6
375.7
377.3
390.2
379.2
333.4
333.2
320.1
327.8
312.0
316.8
338.0
349.4
364.0
394.4
398.0
365.6

718.8
654.3
700.7
619.5
653.4
627.7
683.9
639.1
640.9
624.3
632.7
787.3
827.5
808.8
958.1
1,032.0
1,078.6

1.3
1.0
1.2
1.1
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.2
1.2
1.5
1.5
1.1
1.8
1.5
1.5
5
1.5

720.1
655.3
701.9
620.6
654.4
628.8
685.1
640.3
642.1
625.8
634.2
788.4
829.3
810.3
959.6
1,032.5
1,080.1

100
91
97
86
91
87
95
89
89
87
88
109
115
112
133
143
150

Source: World Bank, Somalia: Agricultural Sector Survey.

with favorable rains, reversed the stagnation of the 1970s. However, a
critical factor in the resulting increase in grain production was extensive horizontal expansion, rather than an improvement in the productivity (or intensive use) of land.31 Sorghum and maize cultivation
increased from a low 109,000 and 460,000 hectares, respectively, at the
end of the 1970s to 259,500 hectares and 516,200 hectares in 1987 (see
Table 3). Sesame and beans showed similar trends. All of the grains
in Table 3 (except rice), particularly maize and sorghum, are rain-fed
crops produced by peasants.
Rice production was stable for the first half of the 1970s but grew
significantly in the latter half of the decade. However, the area under
rice cultivation fell from 6,000 hectares in 1982 to 1,000 hectares in 1983.
Before 1983, rice, unlike other grains, was primarily grown on large
estates. Located near the towns of Jowhar and Jilib, these estates were
managed as parastatals by the Ministry of Agriculture. Although the
producer prices for other grains were significantly below the global
market price during the periods of price controls, that of rice was
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almost identical to the world market price.32 Regardless, farmers were
unable to take advantage of the high price for rice because they had
to sell their produce to the state marketing board. The decline in cultivated area during the 1982–83 season was due to abandonment of state
farm production brought about by the reform process. Its recovery was
slow as peasant farmers steadily readjusted to the new policy environment.
The 1980s was a decade of growth in the grain-producing areas of
the country (see Table 2). There was significant improvement in grain
production in both rain-fed farming regions and the irrigated areas of
the Shabelle and Juba rivers. As noted earlier, this growth was largely
a product of the horizontal expansion of cultivation and reclamation
of farmland abandoned during the era of price controls. In spite of the
promising circumstances, these gains were not sustainable because
they entailed either (1) bringing more marginal or fragile land into
cultivation in rain-fed areas or (2) neglecting institutional support for
the relatively high-potential irrigated river valleys. As an illustration
of the problems of the grain sector, consider irrigated rice production
in the Jowhar Valley along the Shabelle as a case in point. The Shabelle
river valley around the town of Jowhar is a flat, fertile, alluvial plain.
It is less than 500 feet above sea level and about 60 miles northeast of
the capital. Average annual rainfall in the valley is about 600 millimeters. The Shabelle River, which meanders through the valley, dries up
in most years between the months of January and March. Historically,
the valley was home to peasants and pastoralists. However, after the
Italian colonization of southern Somalia, it attracted many investment
projects.
The first and largest investment was a sugar plantation and an associated sugar mill. This plantation/mill complex was established in
1920. Initially owned by Italian colonial interests and later taken over
by the Somali government, the enterprise dominated the town of Jowhar and the surrounding area. At the height of its operations in the
early 1970s, the complex produced enough refined sugar to meet the
country’s domestic needs. It has since declined from production valued at $50 million in 1970 to $15 million in 1981,33 and to complete
collapse in 1988–1989. The demise of the sugar complex devastated the
local economy. Mismanagement, the hallmark of the military regime,
and the apparent siphoning of enterprise resources for the private use
of senior national and regional public officials killed the enterprise,
although the demand for sugar was growing. The experience of the
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Table 3. Cropped Areas in Somalia, 1970-1987 (in thousands of hectares)
Total crop
Landa
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987

571
500.4
638
591.8
580.7
641.1
733.5
764.5
730.8
765
730.8
896
931.9
745.5
964.7
909.1
802.7
984.8

Maize Sorghum

Rice

133
102
117
101
99
106
119
150.6
148.7
147.5
109
197
209
218.6
220
234.3
245.1
259.5

1.3
1.4
1.2
1.2
1.4
1.6
1.8
4.4
9.8
4.8
5.9
5.7
6.0
1.0
1.3
2.6
3.2
3.6

290
280
390
345
330
400
490
458.3
420.1
460.8
456.8
517
540
335.5
544.7
447
385
516.2

Wheat
0.9
0.6
0.8
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.5
3.6
3.6
3.6
0.3
0.0

Beans Groundnuts
21.9
17.8
20.8
17.9
17.6
18.8
19.7
18.8
21.8
16.6
18.5
25.9
27.0
27.0
38.1
46.8
28.9
48.3

3.3
2.6
3.3
2.9
2.8
3.3
3.5
2.5
1.9
2.4
2.5
2.6
3.0
3.0
4.7
5.2
2.9
4.2

Sesame
73
44
57
77
84
57
45
75
75
80
83
90
90
98.4
92
109.2
81
104.7

Source: Somali Democratic Republic, Ministry of Agriculture, Food Early Warning.
Note: a. Total cropland is greater than the sum of crops listed because not all of the land
that could be cultivated is cultivated.

sugar industry is a telling example of the ills of poorly managed public
enterprises and the negative consequences for communities all over
the country.
Rice production was introduced to the valley in the 1960s. This economic program began at an experiment station five kilometers northeast of Jowhar through a project sponsored by the People’s Republic
of China. The purpose was to explore whether Somalia could grow
enough rice to meet a significant part of its own increasing demand.
At the end of the decade, the experimental phase was completed, and
the staff at the station began to encourage its field laborers, most of
whom were peasants from the nearest villages, to plant rice in small
plots on their land.34 By the mid-1970s, a small but increasing number was growing rice. The station supported the efforts of these peasants by providing advice on improved cultivation methods and seeds.
Before this effort had a chance to blossom, however, the newly established Agricultural Development Corporation, a marketing parastatal,
imposed price controls and mandatory deliveries on rice and other
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crops. This policy effectively stopped the expansion of peasant rice cultivation because farmers who were already cultivating the crop abandoned it altogether within two years. Between 1974/1975 and 1983, rice
was grown only at the experiment station and at state farms elsewhere.
However, the promise of improving food self-sufficiency through a
farm-based strategy (particularly in terms of rice) disappeared.
The town of Jowhar and the surrounding villages in the Shabelle
Valley were economically devastated from 1974–1984 by the disintegration of the sugar complex, and the modest expansion in rice production was insufficient to make up for other losses. Relaxation of
price controls in the early 1980s was a necessary but insufficient condition to rekindle peasant enthusiasm. An initiative of a German private
voluntary organization (PVO), AgroAction, and its offer of material
support to two peasant communities were the catalyst that helped rejuvenate rice production in the Jowhar Valley. The experiment station,
which was transformed into a moderately successful state-run rice
farm, was there to provide the necessary seeds, advice, and some other
services.35 The new initiative took off within two years. The growing
economic crisis of the country, the increasing price of food staples, and
the liberalization of land tenure laws made rice production the most
attractive productive investment for anyone who could muster enough
resources to get access to irrigated land. It was not long before many
non-peasants (e.g., merchants, bureaucrats) started producing rice.36
By the winter/spring growing season of 1990, peasant rice producers
were outnumbered by urban-based growers, who used hired labor to
work their land.
Initially, most of these new farmers rented or borrowed land from
peasants and other owners who had extra acreage. As more people
discovered the gains to be made, land prices skyrocketed (from about
the equivalent of U.S. $25 per hectare per growing season to over U.S.
$125 per hectare per season in the fall of 1989). With rent and the price
of irrigable land escalating and economic conditions in the country
sliding further, a land rush ensued. Much riverine land previously
utilized by peasants and pastoralists for grazing and other purposes
was carved up by urbanites, many of who were well connected to the
state. For instance, most of the irrigable land along the Shabelle in the
Jowhar Valley was expropriated through administrative fiat, without
regard being paid to those who traditionally used it. Titles to some
of this land were then given to the favorite sons and daughters of the
regime. By the spring of 1990, urban-based farmers dominated the
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industry and accounted for most of the rice produced in the area. Of
the estimated 1,500 rice growers in the valley, nearly three-fourths were
urban. Although no one knew the exact area under rice cultivation in
the valley, estimates range from 5,000–6,000 hectares. This growth is
substantial, particularly because non-state rice farming barely existed
before 1983.
The preceding discussion of rice production in the Jowhar Valley
indicates that the neo-liberal reform program had induced growth in
the region. Such growth reflects only one side, albeit the positive one,
of the impact that the program had on the agrarian economy. The other
area in which the impact of the reform program was felt was agriculture-related public institutions. Here, forces were set in motion that
went beyond production and affected the capacity of public institutions.37 Among the principal aims of the IMF/World Bank-sponsored
liberalization program were the contraction of the state as a source of
employment and the deregulation of the economy in order to reduce
bureaucratic red tape, economic mismanagement, and resource misuse.
The greatest changes in the public sector generated by the reform
program were not the employment reductions in that sector or the
degree of state intervention in the economy, but rather a subversion
of the ethic of public service and an elevation of greed to new heights.
Moreover, a loss of income brought about by new levels of inflation,
combined with the liberalization of prices, severely eroded public
employee incomes and ultimately led to the decay of public service.
As the reform program unfolded and the monetarist strategy took
hold, inflation rose dramatically. This drove the private sector to adjust
its operations by increasing prices and wages at a comparable rate.
In contrast, the state failed to do the same, thereby allowing public
employee wages to decline precipitously. Thus, the new “prosperity”
in the private sector made the incomes of public employees, including
senior ones, seem paltry. In essence, public employees were expected
to facilitate the accumulation of private wealth without earning a living wage. As a result, public servants ruthlessly began to exploit their
offices for personal gain. Such ethics brought ruin to the state’s capacity to manage public property, and undermined agricultural development, as the following case demonstrates.
The Agricultural Extension and Farm Management Training project
(AEFMET) was planned and designed to overcome the managerial and
technical inadequacy of the Ministry of Agriculture.38 The project was
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funded by World Bank loans from its inception in the late 1970s until
the disintegration of the regime in January 1991. Despite the initial
intentions of its designers, AEFMET was appropriated by the rentier
structure.
The project’s principal mission was to improve agricultural productivity, particularly for small farms. It was expected to popularize new and improved methods of cultivation and husbandry. One of
AEFMET’s important regional offices was in the Middle Shabelle, outside the regional capital of Jowhar, in one of the two most important
agricultural regions in the country. It is in this location that the new
crop, rice, had taken root and was beginning to flourish. Rice producers, particularly peasants who were eager to expand and intensify production, were in desperate need of technical support and guidance, in
the form of timely tractor service, fertilizers, herbicides, and properly
operated irrigation systems. However, getting access to these necessary inputs at a reasonable price proved virtually impossible for the
majority, and the dogged few had to spend inordinate amounts of time
and resources to procure these necessary inputs.
Why did AEFMET’s provisional and national staff pay so little
attention to the needs of rice farmers in the Middle Shabelle? Both the
regional officers and the general manager engaged in rentier activity.
First, the general manager owned a large farm of over 100 hectares
along the banks of the river. He took proprietorship of this land in the
early 1980s, when laws were relaxed and liberalized. The farm was
not bought but was simply a “grant” from the Ministry of Agriculture;
and the equipment that went into leveling and preparing it for cultivation was publicly owned. Moreover, project vehicles were consistently
used for personal and farm-related purposes. In addition, the regional
director of AEFMET would often lend resources and personal assistance to the general manager’s farm operations. He also spent some
of his energy securing project-sponsored scholarships for students to
do graduate work in the United States. In the course of these efforts,
the regional director had to serve the interests of his superior and not
the public. In a nutshell, the resources of the project were captured
by rentiers who were not accountable to anyone. But this practice did
not dissuade the World Bank from continuing to fund the project,
thereby burdening the Somali public with more debt but without much
improvement in agricultural services.
This entire edifice collapsed in January 1991 and chaos became the
norm. Peasants and other rural producers were able to work their land,
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though on a limited scale, during the tyranny of the military regime.
Looting and dispossession have been the fate of most farmers since
the inception of the warlord era. A few NGOs have attempted to provide some services to farmers, but their reach and scope are limited.
Some degree of stability has returned to the Jowhar Valley since a
new warlord took over the region in the late 1990s. This has enabled
some farmers to start producing rice again although they do not have
access to essential services. Other irrigated regions have fared worse
than Jowhar, and stability has yet to be restored. Further, a significant
proportion of the irrigated farms has been confiscated by warlords and
violent gangs, while the legitimate owners languish in camps as internally dispossessed persons. Finally, the rain-fed farming region that
lies between the two perennial rivers continues to be unstable, while
farmers in the northwest have been working their farms for most of the
past decade without any institutional support.

2. Export Sector
When the military regime proclaimed its “scientific socialist” credentials in 1970, the banana economy of the two river valleys was the
most developed capitalist production process in the entire country.
Both labor and agricultural land in the region, particularly on plantations, were highly commodified. Furthermore, the working conditions
of both bonded and temporary labor, particularly the former, were
characteristically colonial. The plantation system in southern Somalia
clearly presented the regime with an opportunity to implement the
“received idea” of socialism.39 Abiding by the tenets of the doctrine
and conscious of the constraints imposed on it by the underdeveloped
structure of its economy, the regime had several options in dealing
with the plantation question. First, it could take the standard doctrinaire approach by simply appropriating the plantations and turning them into state farms. Second, given its proclaimed commitment
to self-reliance and food self-sufficiency, it could gradually transform
these estates into food-producing farms run by quasi-public agencies.
Third, the regime could put forth farm labor legislation to enhance the
bargaining power and well-being of farm workers. This method could
have enabled the regime to avoid some of the pitfalls associated with
state farms and the supposed loss of foreign exchange. The fourth policy option was to enact and implement land reform. Had this alternative been selected, it may have necessitated a shift away from banana
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production, unless some kind of a small, farmer-based contract system
had also been introduced.
Surprisingly, the military regime did not adopt any of the now familiar radical agrarian reform strategies. Its first legislative act concerning
the plantation economy was to take over the banana-marketing apparatus previously run by a settler organization. This step gave birth
to the National Banana Board, assigned to “manage” the industry.
Whatever its intended function, the Board had little positive impact
on the plantation economy. Banana output increased from 145,500 tons
in 1970 to 168,300 tons in 1973. The area under cultivation grew from
6,500 cultivated hectares to 9,500 hectares. Such growth was the result
of investments and improvements made before 1969 or immediately
after the regime came to power. The regime also retained the power of
supreme landlord. In addition, the state’s general ban on the formation
of independent labor unions and industrial action, coupled with the
severity of military justice, foreclosed any possibility for progressive
social action in the plantation economy. Labor functioned under conditions no different from those prevailing during the colonial order or
civilian regimes. In addition, property and social relations inherited
largely from Italian fascist rule remained the basis of the plantation
system.
In spite of the growth and expansion of the banana economy in the
early 1970s, production began its downward spiral in 1974. The area
under cultivation fell by more than 50 percent, from its peak in 1973
to 3,600 hectares in 1981. Fruit production hit rock bottom in 1981
at 59,000 tons, less than a third of the 1973 output. The downturn in
production has been attributed to various maladies: (1) the erosion of
technical know-how as a result of the departure of many of the Italian planters; (2) increased soil salinity as a result of poor drainage
systems; (3) lack of good field supervision; (4) extremely low fertilizer
application (approximately 100 kilograms per hectare, as opposed to
the standard 800 kilograms per hectare); and (5) low export prices and
increased domestic costs of production, i.e., packaging and transport.40
The banana economy was in dire straits in the early 1980s, as were
the rest of the country’s productive sectors. The diplomatic rift between
the regime and the Soviets in the late 1970s, the realignment of the
country’s foreign relations toward the West, and, finally, the adoption
of structural adjustment as a development strategy changed the fortunes of the plantation economy. The confluence of these conditions
spelled the inauguration of a neo-liberal economic policy, prompt-
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Table 4. Banana Production and Value of Exports, 1983–1989

1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989

Area
(in hectares)

Tons

—
4,592.7
5,121.8
6,150.8
6,128.9
6,509.9
6,434.6

62,448
47,860
45,321
57,943
64,004
73,368
74,652

Dollars/ton

Total value
(in millions
of dollars)

Percent
value changea

235
278
287
295
320
320
332

14.7
14.3
13.0
17.0
20.5
32.5
24.9

—
–2.7
–9.1
30.8
20.6
58.5
–23.4

Source: Somalfruit, Statistical Reports. Note: Calculated by author.

ing Italian interests to initiate new negotiations with the government
regarding private investment in the banana sector. These discussions
were successful, and an agreement was signed that established Somalfruit in 1983. Somalfruit, a joint venture, was dominated by the Italian
group, De Nadai.41
De Nadai, through Somalfruit, made credit and agricultural inputs
available to producers and invested in irrigation and marketing.
Consequently, slow but steady progress was made in revitalizing the
industry.42 Except during 1984 and 1985, when the river valleys were
flooded and the crops damaged, banana exports steadily increased
until the disintegration of the country in 1991 (see Table 4). Somalfruit,
which was responsible for mending the industry, deserves the credit
for expanding production and restoring export quality. Moreover,
these achievements and other incentive systems increased returns to
the planter, as will be shown later.
The steady transformation and recovery of the banana economy
were held up as a model that the rest of the economy would do well
to emulate. Growth of the industry was said to be symbolic of the
viability and developmental consequences of collaboration between
international capital, the state, and local entrepreneurs (the so-called
triple alliance). Such a contention is partially valid; however, it overlooks some important drawbacks of the banana economy. Although De
Nadai’s investments in the sector did remarkably transform the plantation system and improve its profitability, the benefits from the growth
and expansion of the industry added little to the well-being of those
who labored in the fields, or to that of the region and the country as a
whole. Unlike the livestock sector, the problem in the banana economy
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Table 5. Earnings of Banana Harvesters
Number of fruit loads/girl
Person

Age

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11

15
9
8
13
11
10
8
10
11
12
11

Day 1

Day 2

Day 3

75
55
35
55
45
55
35
60
75
60
55

65
30
65
40
60
55
65
25
45
60
55

75
55
35
55
45
50
35
60
75
55
60

Day 4

Average
Load

Average Daily
Incomea

65
70.0
30
42.5
40
42.8
60
52.5
50
50.0
65
56.3
25
40.0
65
52.5
45
60.0
60
58.8
55
56.3
Overall average daily income

140
83
87
106
100
112
80
106
120
118
112
106

Source: Author’s fieldwork.
Note: Income in Somali shillings, based on 2 shillings per load.

was one in which some of the most productive agricultural land was
used to benefit senior members of the old regime, the Italian firm, and
fewer than 200 Somali owners.
Banana production is highly labor intensive, and there are over fifteen essential tasks that need to be performed regularly from planting
to harvest. Female children, whose ages ranged from 8 to 15, undertook the overwhelming majority of these tasks. The children who harvested bananas typified the poverty of those who worked in this more
lucrative sector. Their average daily wages amounted to less than U.S.
$0.10 (see Table 5), although the working day began at about 8:30 in the
morning and usually ended around 7:00 in the evening, with a lunch
break around 1:00 in the afternoon. Those engaged in harvest activity
were given a midday meal consisting of cooked bananas with a touch
of cooking oil and a sprinkling of sugar. Their wages were supplemented by some bananas to take home. Such low rates of remuneration
were not enough to buy more than a loaf of bread or five cups of tea or
a kilogram of rice. These were dreadfully low wages, but the children
continued to work under such conditions because unemployment was
so high in the region and the country. Most adult males were unwilling
to work for such wages, so plantation managers hired hungry children.
It is as if the growth and renewed vitality of the industry entailed the
“modernization of poverty.”43
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Table 6. Estimate of the Main Cost Elements in Banana Exports
Percent Contribution
to Retail Unit Price
Reported production cost before harvest
Harvesting and transport to packing plant
Producer’s gross margin
Estimated gross return to growers at packing plant
Packing
Transport to port
Loading and stevedoring
Export tax
Other charges
Exporters gross margin
Free-on-board (FOB) price
Freight and insurance
C.I.F. price
Unloading and handling at port of discharge didiscdischarge
Import duties
Importers gross margin
Free-on-rail (FOR) selling price
Ripeness gross margin
Ripeness selling price
Retailers gross margin
Retail price

Value

8.6
0.9
1.9
11.4
10.0
0.6
1.1
0.3
0.8
1.0
25.2
14.3
39.5
2.0
18.5
5.5
66.0
15.1
81.1
18.9
100.0

Source: International Labour Office, Economic Transformation in a Socialist Framework,
1977, p. 104.

Contrary to the claims of some plantation owners and Somalfruit,
the banana commodity was a profitable one. The large amounts of
investment that were directed into it and the willingness with which
planters envisioned expansions indicate that the industry was healthy.
A rational investor would not sink more resources into enterprises
whose profits are marginal if there is no prospect of better returns in
the future. This assessment is supported further by a 1977 International Labor Organization (ILO) study that discovered that the problem was not the absence of profits, but the distribution of profits among
those involved in the industry, from the producer to the retailer (see
Table 6). The return to a planter who owned a processing center (most
planters did not own such centers), including the cost of production,
was 11.4 percent of the retail price of the fruit at the export market, a
net profit of 1.9 percent of that price. Table 6 also shows that the freeon-board price was 25.2 percent of the retail price. This means that
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Table 7. Banana Free-on-Board Cost Breakdown
Cost item
Producer price
Packing station
Plastic covers
Packing (cartons and plastic)
Transport to port
Quality control
Loading and sundries
Export tax
Overhead expenses
Depreciation
Asset revaluation reserve
Total costs to FOB

Dollars/quintal

Percent of FOBa

15.7
1.64
0.11
8.11
1.35
0.68
0.23
1.47
1.83
1.35
2.10
34.57

45.42
4.74
0.32
23.46
3.91
1.96
0.67
4.25
5.29
3.91
6.07
100

Source: Woodward and Stockton, A Study of the Profitability
Note: Calculated by author

nearly three-fourths of the value of the crop left the country. More
recent data produced by Somalfruit show that the producer’s relative
financial position did improve in terms of the FOB price (see Table 7).
Using the data from the ILO as a baseline, it can be surmised that the
producer’s share of the FOB price increased from 50.16 percent to 54.25
percent, if the planter owned a packing station. Despite these positive
changes, the cost of production accounted for a high proportion of
the producer’s price, and the profit rates were very high downstream
(all Somali banana exports were sold to De Nadai’s parent company).
Because plantation owners had little control over either the cost of necessary inputs purchased from Somalfruit or the final retail price, the
only way they could advance their profit margins was to control other
costs of production, particularly labor. Containing the cost of labor
and enhancing its quality was at the heart of the labor problem in the
plantation economy. Impoverished children were the foundation of the
new profitability, and the returns to the country were minimal.44 Thus,
one wonders how rational it is to use some of the most productive land
in the country in this manner!
The civil war ruined the sector and production became nil at one
point.45 Large swaths of this land have been taken over by warlords
and organized gangs, and banana production and exports remain negligible despite attempts to resuscitate this system.
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D. Fishing
Somalia has the second longest coastline on the African continent,
nearly 1900 miles, and a huge marine economic zone. The fishery
resources of the Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden have substantial
potential, which Somalis have yet to exploit. There was little development in the sector during the old regime although it established
a Ministry of Fisheries. The problem in the sector was one of severe
underutilization of the resource, little infrastructural development, and
a limited domestic market for seafood.
The state’s collapse opened up Somali coastal waters to extensive
illegal fishing by foreign fleets, such as Taiwan, Russia, Thailand,
Japan, and Italy. There is a serious danger that marine life and its
ecological systems are being severely damaged. Estimates of illegal
fishing fleets are between 650 and 900 ships. This is certain to accelerate Somali impoverishment.46 The small, formerly government-owned
fishing fleet has been appropriated by a member of the old guard
and close associate of one of the chief warlords, who has used it as
his private commercial enterprise. In recent years, small enterprises
have re-emerged and the old fish canning plant in Las Qorey has been
partially replaced. Future reconstruction programs must include the
protection and development of this vital sector. Furthermore, any longterm development strategy must include a program of industrialization, without which sustained improvements in the standard of living
are not feasible.
E. The Diversity of Conditions within the Agrarian Economy
The crisis in the Somali agrarian and food sectors was not monolithic
in nature, and the way in which it was manifested in the pastoral/
livestock economy was different from its expression in the crop and
fishing areas. For example, although stagnation and decline occurred
in the former, growth was a characteristic feature of the farm economy,
a result of the liberal reform program that was instituted in the early
1980s, while underdevelopment marked the fisheries.
The condition of the pastoral/livestock sector had two intricately
intertwined dimensions, namely, the ecological and social aspects.
Growth in livestock trade in the last hundred years was a result of the
increasing demands by pastoralists to obtain manufactured commodities, as well as the added claims of non-pastoral social groups, such
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as merchants and the state. It led to horizontal expansion of livestock
production into more marginal areas. Such a growth strategy, combined with the increase in livestock prices in the 1970s introduced by
petrodollars from the Middle East, kept the pastoralist-merchant-state
relationship complementary and unproblematic. The sharp decline in
livestock prices in the Middle East reduced the profitability of Somali
livestock exports, and the downward pressure on prices and profits
meant, in the long run, that the old ways of resolving such a squeeze
(e.g., herd expansion into marginal areas) were not feasible. Thus, the
pastoral/livestock economy came to a crossroads.
The grain sector (irrigated and rain-fed) suffered from several difficulties. First, the increase in the quantity of grains from dryland farming in the 1980s was due to an expansion of the area under cultivation.
In the absence of new farming techniques suitable to dryland areas
or modern inputs to intensify production, rain-fed agriculture was
unlikely to experience further significant growth because most land
suitable for rain-fed farming was already utilized. Second, although
irrigated grain farming (i.e., rice) had been a growth industry in the
1980s, it began to stagnate because of poor husbandry and a lack of
necessary supporting institutions and infrastructure. In the future,
expansion and intensification of irrigated grain production will be
essential in order to rehabilitate the rest of the economy.
The recovery of the plantation economy in the 1980s meant that this
sector was not suffering from the maladies that plagued the pastoral
economy. Prospects for further growth of plantations were very good
prior to the collapse of the regime in 1991. As such, the problems in
the banana economy were not ones of stagnation in later years. Rather,
they originated from the use of scarce and precious irrigated land for
the production of exports, three-fourths of the value of which was realized outside the country. Theoretically, banana exports contributed to
the country’s foreign exchange. However, because most of these earnings remained in foreign hands overseas, the net economic impact of
the industry on the country’s and the region’s capital accumulation
fund was marginal. Moreover, in spite of the growth in banana exports,
those who labored in the fields saw no improvement in their wages or
working conditions.
Somali fisheries, which have substantial potential, have yet to be
developed for the benefit of the country. Both the civilian and military
regimes barely understood the significance of this resource and therefore did little to encourage its development. The most urgent issue is to
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find a way to stop illegal fishing and further damage to marine ecosystems. The underdevelopment of physical and institutional infrastructure was, and is, the principal problem and would require a systematic
and effective modest plan.
IV. The State and the Economy
The poor quality or absence of state leadership has been central to
Somalia’s economic and political misfortunes. Neither a return to the
authoritarian and corrupt order, nor a continuation of warlordism,
nor the adoption of a clumsy neo-liberal project is likely to nurture an
accumulation strategy that would progressively enhance the nation’s
quality of life and heal its deep social wounds. The vital question is:
What is the appropriate role that the state should play in rebuilding the
political and economic fabric of Somali society? This section explores a
menu of options.
Many writers have been surprised by the commercial and entrepreneurial acumen and energy of Somalis to carry on after the disintegration of the country’s government in 1991. This attitude, premised on
the belief that the state is essential for the sustenance of livelihoods, is
somewhat justified since no one had any experience with stateless society in recent history. The excitement about economic activity in a stateless environment should wane, however, because a closer examination
of the informal sectors in economies with states is instructive, since the
latter have qualities similar to those of post-1991 Somalia. The informal
sector in developing economies, although constrained by state regulations, is said to be both dynamic and exploitative,47 but no one expects
it to generate employment opportunities that can sustain even a modest quality of life.
Scholars who are acquainted with the informal sector or the smuggling industry know the acute limits of such economies and are less
exuberant in their commentary, but some recent writings on Somalia
have neglected to address the limits of this economy.48 Jamal Mubarak’s
essay is typical of this trend. He documents the energy of Somalia’s
stateless economy and marvels at its dynamism:
In developed countries, the breakdown and subsequent long absence
of economic institutions alone would be a devastating experience to a
local economy. Even in small economies with a traditional subsistence
agricultural sector, the urban monetary economy could be expected to
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suffer a similar fate. In Somalia, however, its economy has so far proved
to be resilient. Despite the war, recurrent droughts, famine, and the subsequent serious decline in production capacity, its economy muddles
through. Surprisingly, in some areas, the local economy is thriving and
is experiencing an unparalleled economic boom raising the question of
whether absence of government is a blessing in itself (italics mine).49

Although Mubarak recognizes some of the weaknesses of the stateless
economy and the need for legitimate authority, his argument, nonetheless, unwittingly supports the minimalist role of the state, which
neo-liberal financial institutions advocate. Others, such as Peter Little,
are mindful of the pitfalls of an exuberant endorsement of stateless
markets, but maintain a certain degree of enthusiasm in describing
post-1991 economic changes, particularly those related to the livestock
trade in Somalia’s southernmost region. Despite his prudence, Little
implicitly sanctions a minimalist state strategy not very different from
that of Mubarak.50
Our close observations during the last decade have convinced us
that the economy consists of a huge informal and retail sector, and
mafia-like and oligopolistic operations. Small entrepreneurs or businesspersons who come close to operating a legitimate business, as well
as the majority of the indigent population, are the real victims of the
stateless economic environment. We think that a stateless economy is
an extreme version of neo-liberal informality. Although celebratory
studies of the stateless economy provide some insights into the restless
nature of the market in the post-1991 era, they have yet to articulate
a theory that explicates the role of the state in development. In the
absence of such a framework, these studies unwittingly accept the
pervasive rhetoric of free markets, which entrenches a minimalist state
argument.51
State-market relations are more complex than those imagined in
neo-liberal strategy. We posit that, contrary to the ideology of free
markets, two types of capitalist political economies exist: regulated
and stateless. Regulated economies (Figure 1) usually consist of three
sorts: free/stimulated markets, governed markets,52 and rentier markets. What sets the three apart from each other is the degree and type
of state involvement in the operations of the market. Accordingly, in
stimulated or free markets, government establishes a “suitable environment for the entrepreneurs to perform their functions” by develop-
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Figure 1. Regulated Economies

ing and maintaining infrastructure, insuring the validity of contracts,
and keeping law and order.53
In contrast, governed markets are those in which the state provides
strategic guidance to the economy. Governing the market does not
mean that the state deploys blanket regulations to control or own enterprises, but instead utilizes fine-tuned and discriminatory tools to help
establish and nurture productive accumulation and discipline enterprises. As an earlier analyst of the South Korean experiences notes:
The Korean economy depends in large measure on private enterprise
operating under highly centralized government guidance. In Korea the
government’s role is considerably more direct than that of merely setting
the broad rules of the game and in influencing the economy indirectly
through market forces. In fact, the government seems to be a participant
and often the determining influence in nearly all [major] business decisions.54

The state’s “determining” effect entails setting clear and high performance standards for businesses. In the limpid words of Alice Amsden:
…[t]he crucial role of government [was] not only in subsidizing certain industries to stimulate growth, but in setting stringent performance
standards in exchange for the subsidies. In other countries—in Turkey
and India, for example—subsidies have been dispensed primarily as
giveaways. In Korea the “wrong” prices have been right because government discipline over business has enabled subsidies and protection to be
less than elsewhere and more effective.55

The purpose of such a state leadership is to foster accumulation and
transform productivity.56 Evans has advanced these ideas by pointing
out the four ways in which states can intervene: custodian, demiurge,
midwifery, and husbandry.57 Which instruments are deployed and for
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how long depend on the economic conditions of the time, and each
brand is retired as the initial circumstances that necessitated its use are
superseded. Japan pioneered the art of governing markets followed
by the Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs) of East Asia.58 A common element that all states mastering the art share is the managed
synergy between political leaders, strategically located civil servants,
and entrepreneurs.59 State engagement with any enterprise is performance oriented and requires that the industry deliver competitive
export products and services in a set time period. This system is not
immune to corruption and rent-seeking but those practices have been
significantly contained.60 The governed-market model describes how
this triangular political-economic architecture works, and how it has
delivered development to a select number of Third World countries.
In contrast, rentier economies are those in which the state engages in
generalized and deeply intrusive interventions that frustrate legitimate
enterprises and that grant favored rent-seekers plenty of opportunities
to circumvent the general rules. Systemic corruption characterizes this
order. This type of economy has no record of deepening accumulation
or enhancing development. On the contrary, it is characterized by mismanagement and deep poverty. Somalia’s economy was a prototype of
this system in the 1980s.
This schema of state-economy relations provides a menu of options
that is at variance with the standard “advice” offered to crisis-ridden countries.61 The dominant international counsel to Third World
societies is to transition from a rentier order to a free market strategy.
There is no question that stimulated markets are superior to rentier
systems, however the denial of the vital role of the developmentalist
state by certain international institutions has been disingenuous.62 The
master architects of this advice have been the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank.63 These institutions have imposed such constraints on many crisis-ridden countries since the late 1970s. Re-engineering Third World economies via structural adjustment produced
limited success and a great deal of misery. In the face of this poor
performance, the guardian institutions and their donor companions
claimed that the failures were due to the absence of a democratic political order. Consequently, they prescribed “good governance” as the
missing catalyst that would remove domestic political blockages from
the market’s pathways. Multi-party elections and civil service reform
dictated by the donors have occupied center stage since the late 1980s.
The confluence of neo-liberal demands and the desire of local people
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Figure 2. Stateless Economy
to throw off the yoke of dictatorship were expected to produce a synergistic positive-sum outcome. Unfortunately, as Claude Ake so well
observed in 1996, multi-party elections did not translate into policymaking autonomy for countries like Zambia. Political liberalism and
hegemonic neo-liberal economic management have yet to revitalize
accumulation within the continent.64 As I noted in an earlier book, the
combination of rentier African leaders and neo-liberal strategy have
resulted in dire political-economic conditions. Somalia’s fate marks the
ultimate manifestation of such a process.65
Finally, a careful study of this menu of options is vital if the effort to
reconstruct Somalia’s political economy is serious. These discussions of
stimulated/free versus governed markets may seem farfetched given
Somalia’s condition, however I think that these circumstances provide
an opportunity for laying the foundation for long-term development,
the powerful constraints of the present notwithstanding. A neo-liberal
political-economic regime in the context of the present situation will
extend and deepen rentier havens, as is apparent from current developments, and, therefore, will impede productive accumulation. The
point is not that Somalia can develop into a governed market in the
short run, but that the vital institutional embryo of such a system can
be sown now.
Somalia’s stateless economy is neither a stimulated market nor a
governed economy. (See Figure 2) Instead, it consists of a huge informal sector, oligopolist enterprises, rentier milieus backed by the gun,
lawlessness, and environmentally murderous operations. The defining feature of this order is the complete absence of public authority
and security, and the utter neglect of public investment. This economy
could be partitioned into four divisions: warlord-controlled business,
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business-lord-owned enterprises, oligopolistic industry, and small
enterprises in retail, service, and production.
The warlord-controlled sectors have included former state assets,
such as airports, dispossessed plantations and farmland, illegal charcoal production and export, and illegal fishing.66 The warlord is the
sole owner and he controls the revenues to pay his private militias and
accumulate wealth. Business lords have operated in a parallel way
since they import and export whatever they can sell and they have few
competitors. They control most of the armed militias, which are used to
guard their operations. Some of their members have made substantial
fortunes and operate both inside and outside the country. The business
lords are dissimilar to the warlords since most of them do not control
public assets. Yet their reach gives them advantages over smaller enterprises that do not have the resources to establish strong militias.
The third group of big enterprises has been the oligopolistic telephone and money transfer operations. Telephone operations have two
contradictory images. First, they are known to provide the cheapest
telephone rates in Africa. Second, they are inefficient operations since a
customer of one firm cannot communicate with a customer of another
company. Consequently, each customer must have several separate
telephone lines to communicate with others, and all the companies
have been reluctant to form an integrated system (although some progress has been made in this regard). Money transfer companies operate
along the same lines as the telephone companies. Each firm can only
transfer money to its branches located in Somalia and elsewhere in
the Somali-inhabited areas, and customers are underserved when the
company at the point of origination does not have facilities at the
recipient’s end. Money transfer businesses are cost-effective operations
despite the absence of an integrated money transfer network.
Both the telephone and money transfer companies reach a larger
number of places and customers than the old government’s services
ever reached. This is in large measure due to the development of telephone technology since the late 1980s. Their services are certainly an
advance over previous systems, but it should not be a reason for complacency. Telephone and money transfer charges are relatively cheap
by regional standards, but what makes their cost low is not the local
population’s high income but the fact that the payers of the charges
are often diaspora residents. Furthermore, neither operation pays taxes
and therefore does not contribute to public funds used for improving
public services and infrastructure.
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The biggest sector of the economy, measured by the sheer number
of people involved, is the retail commercial and productive sector.
Included in this area are those engaged in professional services (such
as clinics), owners of well-stocked retail stores, market women who
sell a few vegetables and milk, small farmers and livestock owners,
and artisans such as blacksmiths. Other members of the population,
who do not own any assets and who do not receive remittances, live
on starvation wages or handouts. The “buzz” of the market is greatest in this sector as people hustle to survive. Few studies have looked
beneath the bustle to see the market’s soft underbelly and the impoverished lives of those caught up in this context.
What is described above is the terrain in which a new Somali state
must engage. How can it turn the transition into a formative productive process? The prognosis is demoralizing, given the current structure of the economy and the highly corrupt process that produced the
Transitional Federal Government. Despite the incompetence and the
fraudulent behavior and record of many members of the TFG, there
may still be a chance to reverse the calamity and begin something
new.
V. Recovery and Reinventions:
Correspondence between State and Market
Neither the formation of an ill-defined and bloated federal system of
government, dominated by rapacious rentiers, nor a recovery policy
guided by neo-liberal strategy can be a sound recipe for the reestablishment of peaceful coexistence or economic renewal. The destruction of the Somali state was a calamity of extraordinary proportions,
inducing nearly two decades of devastation. However, it can be turned
into a precious opportunity if modest and effective state institutions
take root. This is because social resuscitation and economic rejuvenation will require a strong state, not a repressive and authoritarian one.
Its strategy should be graduated and prioritized along the following
lines: restore law and order, establish a transparent land tenure system,
restore property rights, and, finally, put into place a general strategy
of development. A key mandate of such a state should begin with an
approach to help reorganize the productive sectors of the economy in
such a way that production for local needs is of utmost priority. More
specifically, this new state should not engage in production, but should
act as an efficient facilitator and coordinator. The ultimate measure of
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the state’s effectiveness in revitalizing the economy should be the rate
of growth in production and fairness in the distribution of productive assets among the population. In short, the new polity’s ambition
should be the difficult tasks of growth and equity.
Unfortunately, the alliance of local merchants of violence and rentiers, and an international community disinclined to push for real peace
or assist the Somali people in regaining their autonomy, are the chief
barriers against the type of recovery that can lead to a viable society. In
addition, the extreme fragmentation of the Somali people has made it
difficult to challenge these dominant forces. This is not an easy context
in which to establish the foundation of a governed market economy.
However, the strategy should be to initiate the formation of institutions
that will guide national development after peace and reconciliation is
restored. This can be done by establishing an autonomous national commission during the transition whose task will be to plan and initiate the
embryos of such institutions.
Beyond the transition, the agenda should be to devise a strategy
that will deepen production. What form will such a scheme take in the
agricultural sector? The first major effort will be the coordination of
agrarian reform in the three sectors analyzed here. Such a program will
endeavor to remove any fetters on production, ensure sustainability,
and enhance national capital accumulation. Reform in the pastoral/
livestock sector will affect four aspects: marketing, veterinary, water
services, and, ultimately, range management. Marketing reform will
entail significant changes by establishing markets in strategic locations
that producers can easily reach to unload their stock. Transport from
these markets to the main ports can be licensed to serve the livestock
sector. This reorganization will reduce the vast number of those unproductively employed, which currently draws resources from the sector
without adding value to it. Second, a semi-public shipping company
can be created which will own and manage ships that transport livestock and other commodities to and from the export markets of the
Middle East. Making livestock shipment an integral part of the local
economy will ensure that a significant amount of the revenue generated—currently captured by foreign interests—stays in the local economy, enhancing the overall profitability of the sector. These marketing
arrangements should operate on a commercial basis, and must have
autonomous managerial staff. The state’s responsibility is to ensure
that these terms are respected. Veterinary services will be provided by
an autonomous agency of a Ministry of Agrarian Affairs. Again, such
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a public organization will operate on a commercial basis, although
the state will subsidize it for the first five years, as the agency builds
its assets. The purpose of such an arrangement is to make the service
delivery system more responsive to the needs of the producers, but also
to keep a close eye on public safety and interest. Further, the development of water resources for the pastoral economy can be managed by
a national water resources board within the ambit of the Agrarian Ministry, in close consultation with regional producer associations. Control
and use of water resources on the pastoral range is pivotal in undertaking sustainable pastoral development because of the absence of other
sound and appropriate methods of range management. Finally, the
fundamental objectives of pastoral/livestock reform are to: (1) increase
the returns to producers by incorporating more economic activities into
their sphere; (2) secure responsiveness of public agencies who serve
producers; (3) enhance producer participation in setting national policy that affects their well-being; and (4) use foreign exchange earnings
for productive purposes in that and complementary sectors. Agrarian
reform in the farm sector will necessitate land (re)distribution, restitution, reorientation of resource use to aim for national food self-reliance,
environmental conservation, and the establishment and development
of effective and accountable institutions to serve a growing economy.
The purpose of land (re)distribution is to ensure equitable access to this
increasingly scarce but precious asset. Although farm size distribution
will depend on the ecological conditions of particular areas (e.g., irrigated/riverine versus rain-fed), a basic farm size of three hectares per
household could be envisaged in the riverine environments. A resurrection program should also guarantee access to riverine irrigation to
farmers, as well as grazing and watering rights to pastoralists. Finally,
such a program should not allow for absentee ownership.
These changes should be designed and implemented by a national
agency attached to a Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and regionally based
Councils of Farmers. Such councils will be central to a democratically
elected body whose purpose is to promote equity of resource distribution and represent farmers’ interests in regional and national forums.
An organization of this kind can also function as a marketing structure
whose books are open to public scrutiny. The rationale for such an
organization and its relationship to the state is to guard the interests of
the farming population and secure a national agenda in the farm sector.
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A land reform program will directly and comprehensively affect
the plantation economy in several ways. First, land resources will be
redistributed, based on the three-hectare farm size, to those who have
worked on plantations and to others in the surrounding areas. The
idea here is to get away from the plantation system. Second, these
small farmers will become part of a household-based, food-export-producing agricultural system. The emphasis of the farm sector, particularly in high-potential areas, will be food production for local markets.
However, a portion of household land (e.g., a third) can be devoted to
export crop production. Marketing and transportation of export crops
will be within the purview of farmers’ cooperatives. Again, the purpose is to increase returns to farmers and encourage productive use
of resources. Thus, public policy in the agrarian economy must ensure
that the foreign exchange (saved by the growth of domestic food production and also that earned by livestock/meat and crop exports) is
used to further enhance the productive capacities in these and other
emerging areas. Such a program, and the subsequent growth in the
sector, will begin to provide a stable basis for national economic recovery.
The basic function of an agrarian ministry will be to conduct fieldbased research, in concert with a rehabilitated college of agriculture;
deliver farm inputs to farmers’ associations; watch over the development, management, and maintenance of irrigation systems; and pursue environmental conservation.
Fisheries have great promise but will require tremendous support
from the new government. There will be a need to establish an autonomous marine affairs agency, run on commercial grounds after the
initial five years, that would regulate the industry and help support
initial investment to get the sector off the ground. As in the agrarian
reform program, the priority will be to facilitate the development of
small fishing enterprises and overseas marketing.
Finally, the enormous but necessary task of transforming the country’s agrarian economy is an issue still outside the scope of current
discussions among Somalis. A program, such as sketched here, will
require an unprecedented degree of foresight, coupled with disciplined intellect and efficiency, and must be carried forward by collaboration between a steady public force and producers. The kind of
coordination and market guidance that this will demand will come
not through the guise of local Bantustans, but through a responsive
and effective national state determined to engage the exacting balance
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between growth and equity. The likelihood of creating a sustainable
economy in a peaceful and united Somalia is quite remote without
such a state. An essential companion to this state is an autonomous
and democratically organized agrarian population that can hold the
political authority accountable. This is the basis for a viable civil society, and it has the potential to create broad-based cross-regional alliances of producers that will supersede the self-defeating animosities
engendered by the polarization of clanism. A social arrangement of
this kind calls for household ownership of productive resources and
for cooperative organizations of producers geared to the provision of
necessary services. The strengthening of civil society and the state on
their own terms necessitates a different kind of democracy than anything Somalis have created thus far. If the political history of the first
nine years of the country taught us anything, it is that the numerous
parties that competed in the last election had the identical motive of
raiding the public purse for individual gain. Siyaad Barre and clanistic militarism turned the looting of the commons into a crude and
poisonous art. Warlords, factional, and regional pretenders have only
worsened the syndrome and, thus, have created dead ends. Institutionalizing clanism and rentier officials via a federal form of government will not only be a farce, but will precipitate further descent into
the pit of pauperism and sectarian savagery. The recent people’s revolt
in Mogadishu and the Benadir region, and the appearance, albeit no
more, of the Union of Islamic Courts, offered a glimpse of the yearning
of the Somali people.
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